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Abstract
We customize the aggregative game approach to oligopoly to study asymmetric media
markets. Advertiser, platform, and consumer surplus are tied together by a simple
summary statistic. When media are ad-financed and ads are a nuisance to consumers
we establish see-saws between consumers and advertisers. Entry of a lower-quality
platform increases consumer surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus if industry plat-
form profits decrease with entry. Merger decreases consumer surplus, but advertiser
surplus increases when the profits of the higher-quality platform within the merger
increase. By contrast, when platforms use two-sided pricing or consumers like adver-
tising, advertiser and consumer interests are often aligned.
JEL Classifications: D43, L13
Keywords: media economics, mergers, entry, advertising, aggregative games
1 Introduction
Standard imperfectly competitive markets tend to have consumer and producer in-
terests diametrically opposed - what helps one side adversely affects the other side.
For example, incumbent producers are hurt by new entrants, while consumers gain
through lower prices and more variety. Contrarily, profitable mergers typically harm
consumers (absent sufficient synergies), while benefitting firms. Our focus here is
on two-sided markets — and media markets in particular — where there are three
groups of protagonists which interact. In addition to firms (the media “platforms”)
and consumers, there are advertisers. Our research question is what happens to the
advertisers when market structure changes. We show that consumer and platform
interests are still opposed, so that we want to know with which side advertiser inter-
ests are aligned. In the base case where platforms are solely financed by advertising
revenue, one might expect that it would be the advertisers who are hurt when plat-
forms profits rise, for the advertisers are the customers paying the price. Surprisingly
perhaps, it is in this case (when ads are a nuisance to consumers) that advertisers’
interests are actually aligned with platforms. Because consumers are still hurt, we call
this a media see-saw — advertiser and consumer interests are opposed.1 Our objective
in this paper is to determine the extent of such see-saws, by evaluating circumstances
in which see-saws arise. When ads are actually valued by consumers, such see-saws
tend not to arise; neither do they appear when platforms set prices to consumers
in addition to advertisers. Instead, consumer and advertiser surpluses tend to both
move together.
To establish when see-saws arise, and to investigate strategic interaction in media
1Rochet and Tirole (2006) refer to a seesaw principle when a change conducive to a lower price
on one side leads to a higher price on the other side. We use the term to evaluate surplus effects, as
we ask whether a change conducive to a lower surplus on one side leads to a higher surplus on the
other side.
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markets more generally, we develop a framework with asymmetric oligopoly media
platforms and deploy the toolkit of aggregative games (see Acemoglu and Jensen,
2013, for a summary). Through judicious use of an aggregator function, we can
phrase the two-sided market models we consider as aggregative games. This approach
delivers a full equilibrium characterization in various differing contexts. We can then
engage these tools to describe the effects of entry, mergers, and ad caps in media
markets. We show that in the standard media economics setting, all participants’
surpluses can be tracked as a function only of the aggregate. Along the way, we also
provide and engage a new result relating advertiser surplus to profits under the weak
assumption of log-concavity of advertiser demand functions. This allows us to obtain
clear-cut results on advertiser surplus to establish when see-saws arise.
In ad-financed media markets where ad is a nuisance, platform entry gives rise
to a see-saw if platform industry profits decrease with entry. After entry consumers
are better off, but advertisers are worse off. A merger between two media platforms
gives rise to a see-saw if the profits of the merging platform with the higher quality
increases with the merger. After the merger consumers are worse off, but advertisers
are better off. The imposition of ad caps leads yet to another see-saw. An ad cap not
only reduces ad levels of platforms exceeding the cap prior to its introduction, but also
of the other (unconstrained) platforms. Consumers benefit from ad caps, while ad-
vertisers lose (even though additional consumers are attracted after the introduction
of the cap).
Entry into some media markets (especially radio and broadcast TV) is controlled
through licensing (e.g., by the FCC in the US), and media mergers are subject to
stricter restrictions than other mergers. When analyzing the consequences in such
contexts, it is important to recognize that there is an additional group impacted —
the advertisers. When see-saws are present, consumer surplus standards may allow
through policies that harm advertisers. Often such advertisers could be small busi-
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nesses (rather than media monolith platforms) whose concerns might be highly valued
socially. Our analysis underscores that ad-financed media markets require a dedicated
welfare analysis.
Our paper builds on the literature of two-sided markets (Rochet and Tirole, 2003,
2006; Armstrong, 2006) and, in particular, media markets which feature one-sided
pricing (Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac, 2004; Anderson and Coate, 2005; Peitz
and Valletti, 2008). All these analyses consider symmetric duopoly market where
consumers are located on a Hotelling line. Crampes, Haritchabalet, and Jullien (2009)
analyze symmetric oligopoly where platforms and consumers are located on the Salop
circle (which, as with the above mentioned papers, features full market coverage).
Anderson (2012) sketches a monopolistic competition media model with logit demand.
We generalize the logit specification and analyze asymmetric platform oligopoly. To
do so, we are the first in the context of two-sided markets to make use of aggregative
game tools. Our focus is markedly different from the existing literature, as we evaluate
surplus effects on the two sides of the market due to entry, merger or advertising
regulation.
Our application to mergers connects to the classic merger literature. As with price
competition and differentiated products (Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), a merger
is always profitable. It also connects to the recent empirical work on media mergers
(e.g., Chandra and Collard-Wexler, 2009; Fan, 2013; Jeziorski, 2014a, 2014b; Ivaldi
and Zhang, 2015).2
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we provide some relevant pre-
2An important empirical question is to identify how media platform characteristics change with
a merger. In our theoretical analysis we presume that horizontal attributes of the media platform
remain unchanged. Thus our analysis can be seen as a merger analysis under editorial indepen-
dence. Such an analysis is relevant when the owner may deliberately decide not to intervene in the
programming decisions by the editorial staff and maintain editorial independence of the two media
platforms. Such independence may also be the result of a merger remedy imposed by the antitrust
authority, as has happened in a number of newspaper merger cases. See also the counterfactual
simulation by Ivaldi and Zhang (2015) for French free-to-air television.
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liminaries on aggregative games. In section 3, we present the asymmetric oligopoly
media platform model under ad-finance. In section 4, we characterize the equilibrium
(when consumers like or dislike ads) with respect to equilibrium ad levels and provide
comparative statics results for platform profits and consumer surplus. In section 5,
we focus on advertiser surplus when ads are a nuisance and establish see-saws un-
der entry, merger, and ad cap regulation. We also argue that see-saws are unlikely
to emerge when consumers like ads. In section 6, we introduce two-sided pricing
whereby platforms also make revenues from charging subscription fees to consumers.
Even though each platform now has two instruments, we are able to construct an
aggregator function and make use of aggregative game tools. We show that while
see-saws may rarely emerge in such markets, they are not a general feature in such
a context, as platforms do not use advertising levels strategically when they have a
second instrument. In section 7 we conclude.
2 Preliminaries on aggregative games
The media market models in this paper have an aggregative game structure, which en-
ables us to derive characterization and comparative static properties from the aggrega-
tive game approach. We next review the results we use from the aggregative game
toolkit for Industrial Organization given in Anderson, Erkal, and Picinnin (2013).
Suppose that each firm’s profit can be written as Π (Ψ) where  is firm ’s
action variable,  = 1  , 0 is a constant and Ψ = Σ=0 is the aggregate (see, for
instance, Acemoglu and Jensen, 2013). Prominent examples include oligopolies with
price-setting firms and logit or CES demand,3 and homogeneous product Cournot
competition too. Each firm solves the problem argmax Π(  +
P
 6= ).
3For background references to such topics as the IIA property, logit and CES formulations, and
differentiated product models of oligopoly, see Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992).
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The first-order condition can be written as
Π (Ψ)
 +
Π (Ψ)
Ψ = 0  = 1  
and pins down a relationship between  and Ψ. If Π is strictly quasi-concave,
this equation implicitly defines the inclusive best reply function,  (Ψ), as ’s action
that brings the total actions to Ψ. This follows Selten (1970) and differs from the
standard way to write best replies as functions of the actions of all other players.
However, the two concepts are quite related: in particular,  is an increasing function
if actions are strategic complements (see Anderson, Erkal, and Picinnin, 2013, for
details). Suppose that the game is competitive in the sense that a higher Ψ reduces
profits (the simplest example is the homogeneous products Cournot model for which
the aggregate is simply aggregate output), so that the second term in the first-order
condition above is negative.
Equilibrium constitutes a fixed point, namely the equilibrium aggregate is given
by Ψ∗ = 0 + Σ=1 (Ψ∗) which is depicted simply graphically as the point where
the sum of the inclusive best reply functions crosses the 45-degree line. Continuity
of (Ψ) for all  = 1   implies equilibrium existence. Absent continuity, strategic
complementarity ensures equilibrium existence by Tarski’s fixed point theorem. The
equilibrium is unique if the  (Ψ) are continuous and Σ0 (Ψ∗)  1. Hence, for
strategic complements, we need an upper bound for the slope of the inclusive best
reply. A sufficient condition for uniqueness is that
Condition 1 0(Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ for all  = 1  .
Summing over all , Condition 1 implies the desired slope property that Σ0 (Ψ∗)  1.
Both the difference across agents in equilibrium and comparative statics can be
depicted and derived simply with this device. In particular, “weaker” agents (in
the sense of those with lower inclusive best reply functions) have lower equilibrium
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actions, and a change rendering an agent’s behavior more aggressive (i.e., shifting up
its best reply function) will increase its own equilibrium action, increase the aggregate
and increase other players’ actions when actions are strategic complements.
3 Ad-financed media: the actors and the model
We consider a market in which media deliver consumer attention to advertisers. Par-
ticipants on both consumer and advertiser sides of the market are atomless. The
platforms host ads and are attended by consumers. They set ad levels, which are ob-
served by all players, and then consumers and advertisers choose which platform(s) to
join.4 We next describe the preferences of the consumers, advertisers, and platforms.
Consumers
We deploy a discrete-choice model of media consumption.5 The attractiveness of
a particular option depends upon its net quality,  = −,  = 1  , where  is
gross quality,  denotes the net nuisance per ad, factoring in any expected consumer
benefits from being exposed to the ad, and  is the number of ads on platform .
We allow for this “nuisance” to be negative, so that   0 corresponds to where
consumers enjoy ads per se, or else benefit enough from ad exposure (e.g., learning
about new consumption possibilities).6
We assume that consumer demand for platform  takes the fractional form asso-
4Recent surveys of the literature on such models are in the Handbook of Media Economics,
in particular Anderson and Jullien (2015) on the two-sided ad-financed business model, Peitz and
Reisinger (2014) on applications to the economics of the Internet, and Foros, Kind, and Sorgard
(2015) for the anti-trust implications. The Handbook also includes surveys for particular industries
(TV, radio, newspapers and magazines).
5Thus consumers single-home (as mentioned above). Recent work (Ambrus, Calvano, and
Reisinger, 2014, and Anderson, Foros, and Kind, 2014) has included multi-homing consumers in
two-sided media markets. We comment on this issue in the conclusion.
6Our framework easily generalizes to allow for platform-specific nuisance parameters, . Our
comparative statics results continue to hold as long as all ,  = 1  , are of the same sign.
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ciated with Luce (1959):
(a) = ()Σ=0()   = 1  (1)
where we assume
Assumption 1 () is increasing, log-concave and twice continuously differentiable.
The borderline case is that  is log-linear, in which case  = exp (), which we
shall refer to as the standard logit case, and where  is a positive parameter reflecting
platform heterogeneity. Notice that demand is higher for options delivering higher
net quality, and let (0) denote the attractiveness of watching no channel. In the
sequel, we shall use the denominator in (1) as a measure of consumer benefits from
the media sector: the higher it is, the more the benefit. One justification is given
in the next paragraph, although we do not need to espouse the particular model in
order for our results to hold.
One possible consumer-theoretic underpinning for the form (1) is a familiar ran-
dom utility model whereby each consumer chooses the platform (or outside option 0
with net quality 0) to maximize
 = ln() +   = 0 1   (2)
where the  are i.i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value (which delivers the logit model)
with standard deviation   0.7 A consumer with realization ε chooses option
 ∈ {0 1  } if  ≥  for all  = 0 1  . This formulation yields the familiar
log-sum form for consumer surplus associated to the Logit model:
 =  ln
Ã X
=0
()
!
 (3)
7See Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse (1992) for more details.
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This form satisfies the claim above that consumer benefits increase in the value of
the denominator of (1). It is also a useful module for extending the model to allow
for subscription pricing.
Advertisers
Since consumers “single-home”, the only way for an advertiser to reach a particular
consumer is to place an ad on the channel she is watching.8 Any ad on the channel
is assumed to be seen by all the viewers there, and we assume there is no benefit to
showing more than one ad per channel. Furthermore, advertisers’ profits (gross of
the costs of advertising) are assumed to be proportional to the number of consumers
reached, and independent of the number or identities of other advertisers on the
channels. Together, this means that each advertiser’s decision on where to advertise
is taken independently channel by channel, irrespective of whatever other channels
are selected.
We rank advertisers in terms of decreasing per-viewer willingness to pay, , to
contact viewers and so  () is the per-viewer willingness to pay of the marginal
(th) advertiser if there are  ads on platform . This willingness to pay is the
expected surplus to the advertiser generated by an advertiser-viewer match.
Assumption 2 () is twice continuously differentiable and has non-increasing in-
verse elasticity, (0()())0 ≤ 0. When advertising is not a nuisance (  0),
we strengthen the assumption by requiring that () is log-concave and that
there is an  such that ()  0 for all    and () = 0 for all   .
A non-increasing elasticity requires that () is concave or not “too” convex. It
includes all log-concave inverse demand functions (because 0()() non-increasing
in  implies that (0())() non-increasing in  for 0()  0). It also includes
constant elasticity demand as the borderline case.
8This set-up gives rise to the “competitive bottleneck” of Armstrong (2006) that platforms control
access to “their” consumers.
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We define platform revenue per viewer as () = (). An implication of As-
sumption 2 is that () is strictly log-concave in (the relevant range of) . When
  0, this follows directly from the log-concavity of (). The elasticity assumption
implies strict log-concavity of () when   0.9
We define the per viewer monopoly advertising level, , as the solution to0() =
0 (which is uniquely determined under Assumption 2). Hence, () is strictly log-
concave on (0 ).
Net advertiser surplus per viewer is
() =
Z 
0
(()− ())
Gross advertiser surplus per viewer is () = R 
0
() = () +(). Clearly,
() = (), which is the per-viewer willingness to pay of the marginal ad-
vertiser, and () = −0(). Letting  denote the fraction of consumers
on platform , then the advertiser surplus on platform  is (), and industry
advertiser surplus is (a) =P=1 ().
We establish the important property that the ratio of advertiser surplus per viewer
to ad revenues per viewer is non-decreasing in ad level  under our elasticity condition,
which is implied by Assumption 2. To the best of our knowledge, this result is novel.10
This property will play a key role in establishing see-saws in Section 5, as it will allow
9To see this, we write 0 = (1)(1 + [0()()]) and show that 0 is decreasing. We
have µ0()
()
¶0
=
1

µ0()

¶0
− 12
µ0()
() + 1
¶
=
1

µ0()

¶0
− 1
0()
() 
The first term is non-positive by Assumption 2 and the second term is negative as long as 0() is
positive.
10Translated into a demand curve context, it says that the ratio of consumer surplus to revenue
is increasing in the quantity if the inverse price elasticity is non-increasing. This relates to the
literature on pass-through as enunciated by Weyl and Fabinger (2013), because it addresses how an
exogenous change, transmitted by a change in quantity, affects the surplus ratio.
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us to establish a link between the change of platform profits and advertiser surplus.
Lemma 1 If (0()())0 ≤ 0, then (()()) ≥ 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Because () = () +(), we have to show that
(()() )
 =
(()() )
 =
 ¡R 
0
()± R 
0
0()¢
 ≥ 0
This is equivalent to
R 
0
0() R 
0
() non-increasing in , or
0 ()
Z 
0
()−  ()
Z 
0
0() ≤ 0
Noting that 0()() non-increasing in  is equivalent to 0()() non-increasing
in  and so Z 
0
0() =
Z 
0
0()
 ()  ()  ≥
0()
 ()
Z 
0
 () 
and the desired condition follows.
Platforms
Platform ’s profit is
Π = (a) () = ()(a)
where Assumption 2 implies that the revenue per viewer, () = () is strictly
log-concave in .
Actions and Aggregate
We are now in a position to write each platform’s objective as a function of an
action  and the corresponding aggregate Ψ =P=0 , where we define 0 =  (0)
as the “constant action” of the outside option. Indeed, let ’s action be  = (),
where we recall that  =  − . This defines the implicit relation between the
action and the chosen ad level, with the property
0() = − 10()  (4)
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Therefore the chosen ad level varies directly with the platform’s action for   0, and
it varies inversely with it for   0.
Demand for platform  is  = Ψ; i.e., demand of platform  depends only on
its own transformed action  and the aggregate Ψ.11 We can then write platform
profit as
Π(Ψ) = (())Ψ   = 0 1   (5)
Clearly, this function satisfies the competitiveness property; i.e., that profits decrease
in the aggregate Ψ.
4 Equilibrium analysis
4.1 Characterization
For  = 0, viewer demand is independent of the advertising level. Hence, each
platform acts as a monopolist on the advertiser side and market demand is exogenous.
Therefore, platforms set the monopoly advertising level  = argmax(). In the
sequel all results exclude this case.
Strategic interaction arises when  6= 0. Each platform chooses its ad level, ,
and because  is a monotonic function of  we can find the equilibrium action by
differentiating (5) with respect to . The first-order condition for platform  is
Π
 = 
0(())0()Ψ +(())
µ
1
Ψ −

Ψ2
¶
= 0  = 0 1  
The first-order conditions can be rewritten as

Ψ = 1 +
0(())
(()) 
0() (6)
= 1− 
0(())
(())
()
0()  (7)
11Demand of the form  = Ψ includes oligopoly models with logit and the Luce (1959) form
of demand, and duopoly models based on Hotelling models which are predominant in the literature,
such as the one presented in Anderson and Coate (2005). A logit specification is provided by
Anderson (2012).
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where the second line uses (4). Since the right-hand side is decreasing in  (as shown
in Lemma 2 below) while the left-hand side is increasing, first-order conditions define
inclusive best reply functions (Ψ). In the Appendix we show that the inclusive best
replies satisfy a key characterization property.
Lemma 2 Slopes of inclusive best replies obey 0  0 (Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ ; i.e., actions are
strategic complements and market shares decrease in Ψ.
The lemma establishes that the slope Condition 1 holds.12
Whenever  6= 0, each platform chooses a larger action in response to an increase
of the aggregate; however, their relative contribution to the aggregate declines. An
increase in the aggregate means that competition is relaxed. For   0, platform
 then chooses a larger advertising level closer to the monopoly level. For   0,
it chooses a smaller advertising level closer to the monopoly level. With respect to
the viewer demand, competition in ad levels plays out similar to price competition in
standard oligopoly models for   0, whereas it is similar to quality competition for
  0; both cases exhibit strategic complementarities.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique equilibrium. In equilibrium, (7) holds for all
platforms .
Proof. First note that we can restrict attention to ad levels  ∈ [0 ] for   0
because  dominates any higher ad level.13 Similarly,  ∈ [ ] for   0, where 
solves () = 0 (see Assumption 2) because  dominates any lower ad level, and the
platform will never set a higher ad level than , as this would lead to zero revenues.
Under the monotone transformation  = ( − ),  is chosen from [( −
) ()] for   0 and from [( − ) ( − )] for   0. Thus, the sum of
12The slope condition 0  Ψ also implies that the second-order condition 2Π2  0 holds.
13Both revenue per viewer and number of viewers would be lower for   .
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inclusive best replies
P
=0 (Ψ) is defined on [max∈{1} ( − )
P
=1 () +
0] for   0, and on [max∈{1} ( − )P=1 ( − ) + 0] for   0.14
The sum of inclusive best reply functions
P
=1 (Ψ) + 0 maps from a compact
interval into itself. Since (Ψ) for all  is continuous in Ψ, there must exist a solution
to 0 +P=1 (Ψ) = Ψ and, therefore, an equilibrium exists. Furthermore, since by
Lemma 2 0 (Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ (i.e., the slope Condition 1 holds), the sum of inclusive best
replies has slope less than 1 in any equilibrium, and thus has to cross the diagonal
from above. Hence, the equilibrium is unique.
In asymmetric markets, the pattern of platform characteristics  matters for equi-
librium levels. We characterize how the relative position of platforms with respect
to their characteristic  translates into their relative position with respect to market
share  and advertising level . The next (cross-section comparison) result describes
economic outcomes when the only difference between media platforms is their con-
tent quality (in particular, no joint ownership or cross share-holdings). It shows that
platforms’ market shares follow the same ranking. Ad levels follow the same ranking
for   0,15 and the opposite one for   0.
Proposition 2 Consider any two platforms  and . For   0,    implies
in equilibrium that   ,   , and Π  Π. For   0,    implies in
equilibrium that   ,   , and Π  Π. ( =  implies in equilibrium that
 = ,  = , and Π = Π.)
Proof. We first show that    if and only if   . The proof is by
contradiction.    is equivalent to   , which, since  is strictly increasing,
14The max operator here ensures that (Ψ)  Ψ for all  on the interior of the intervals.
15In the special case where  is log-linear, Anderson (2012) has shown that higher quality implies
higher ad levels.
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is equivalent to   . Using (7), the inequality    is equivalent to
0(())
(())
1

()
0() 
0(())
(())
1

()
0() (8)
Recall that along the best response0 has the same sign as  and that ()0() ≥
0 (because  is log-concave in ). Thus, both sides are positive.
Suppose, by way of contradiction, that   . The strict log-concavity of 
implies that 0 is strictly decreasing and so then
1

0(())
(()) 
1

0(())
(()) 
Thus, for (8) to be satisfied, we must have
()
0() 
()
0() 
Because 0 is non-decreasing, we have   , which is a contradiction.
Therefore,    if and only if    for   0, whereas    if and only
if    for   0. Using the definition of , since    and   , we must
have    for   0 and, since    and   , we must again have    for
  0. The result that  =  implies that  =  and  =  is obvious.
Because each platform chooses its ad level in the increasing part of  for   0
and in the decreasing part of  for   0,    implies that ()  (). As a
higher-quality platform also has more viewers,    implies that Π  Π.
For  = 0, each platform would set its ad level at the monopoly solution  which
solves 0() = 0. When ads are a nuisance (  0), platforms set, in equilibrium,
   as they compete for viewers. The proposition establishes that in this case
high-quality platforms carry more ads than lower-quality platforms, but are still more
attractive such that they attract more viewers than lower-quality platforms despite
the higher nuisance (   if   ). This finding is analogous to price competition
models with horizontal product differentiation and quality differences between firms:
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a high-quality firm sets a higher price and obtains a larger market share than a low-
quality firm — this, for instance, holds in the Hotelling model (see Anderson and de
Palma, 2001, for such a result for -firm oligopoly). When viewers like ads, platforms
choose ad levels that exceed optimal ad level for fixed viewer demand, . Then
a higher-quality platform chooses its ad level closer to the monopoly level than a
lower-quality platform (   if   ).
Advertisers with a high willingness to pay advertise on all platforms. Advertisers
with a rather low willingness to pay advertise on few platforms, if at all, and they
advertise on high-quality platforms for   0 and low quality ones for   0.
4.2 Comparative statics
In this sub-section, we first deliver the analytical background needed to determine
the comparative static results. Then we apply these methods to entry and mergers
respectively.
Consumer surplus and platform profits
The key is that equilibrium values depend on the aggregate Ψ, and so we need
to determine this relation for the various variables of interest. The first result is
immediate from (3):  =  ln (P=0 ()) =  lnΨ, where we used the definition
of the aggregate, and hence
Lemma 3 Consumer surplus  is an increasing function of the aggregate Ψ.
The monotonicity of  implies that comparative statics results on consumer
surplus immediately follow from changes in the aggregate Ψ.
To evaluate the effect of policy interventions, we have to understand how market
shares  = Ψ depend on the aggregate. Suppose that we compare two situations
with two different aggregates. We call “outsiders” all those platforms whose inclusive
best reply function are the same in both situations; i.e., the exogenous change or
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policy intervention has no effect on the outsiders’ payoff function. By contrast, we
call “insiders” those platforms whose inclusive best reply functions are shifted. A
platform either belongs to the group of insiders,  ∈ , or of outsiders,  ∈ .
We first recall from Lemma 2 that outsiders’ market shares decrease with Ψ. This
effect is reinforced by higher equilibrium actions, and hence lower profits, as the next
result establishes.
Lemma 4 A change that induces an increase in the aggregate Ψ leads to lower plat-
form profits for each outsider media platform, i.e., Π∗ Ψ  0 for all  ∈ .
Proof. The profit change is Π
∗Ψ =
Ψ +  Ψ . By Lemma 2, the first term on the
right-hand side is negative. Now write out the term Ψ = 0 () 0()0(Ψ). Because
0 () and 0() have opposite signs,16 and 0(Ψ)  0, then Ψ  0 and the claim
follows.
The effects on insiders depend on the particular exogenous variation or policy
intervention. In what follows, we consider three such types: entry, media mergers, and
advertising regulation and provide results on platform profits and consumer surplus.
As results on industry advertiser surplus do not directly follow from changes of the
aggregate we defer results on them to Section 5.
Entry of Media Platforms
We consider (exogenous) entry of a media platform; such exogenous entry may
be the outcome of regulatory measures, e.g. by granting an additional license.17
As illustrated by Figure 1 (where the superscript  refers to the new situation, with
entry), due to entry, the new firm’s inclusive best reply shifts the sum of inclusive best
replies upward. This implies that the equilibrium aggregate is larger after entry. The
16For   0, 0  0 in equilibrium because platforms carry less advertising than , while
0()  0 because ads are a nuisance. Contrarily, for   0, 0  0 in equilibrium, while 0()  0.
17Our result with exogenous entry also translates into a setting with endogenous entry where, at
a prior entry stage, firms decide whether to pay an entry cost to enter the market. A lower entry
cost or an increase in the total mass of potential viewers then leads to entry.
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Figure 1: Entry and equilibrium aggregate
aggregative game framework delivers crisp results on the comparative static results
for effects on consumer surplus and other platforms’ profits.
Proposition 3 The entry of an additional platform
1. decreases other platforms’ profits,
2. increases consumer surplus.
Proof. The new platform  + 1 has an inclusive best reply +1(Ψ)  0. Hence,
the aggregate Ψ goes up (for illustration, see Figure 1). Consumer surplus increases
from Lemma 3. By strategic complementarity,  increases for  = 1  : because
17
all rivals’  increase, platform ’s profit must decrease ( 6=  + 1) and the first
statement holds.
The opposite directions for profits of existing firms and consumer surplus are
standard: what is new to the two-sided market case is what happens to the other
platform participants, the advertisers. Entry of an additional platform decreases
advertising on other platforms for   0 and increases it for   0: the effects on
advertiser surplus are deferred to the next section.
Regarding platform industry profits, there is a tension between lower profits of
the existing platforms  = 1   and profits of the entering firm. Industry profits
tend to increase with entry if platforms are poor substitutes and decrease if they are
close substitutes. Whether or not industry platform profits increase with entry will
turn out to be critical to evaluate the change of industry advertiser surplus in the
following section.
Media Mergers
Media mergers have received quite some attention in the policy debate. Here, we
explore the allocative effects of an exogenous media merger and its welfare implica-
tions in our model. Superscript  refers to the new situation, after the merger.18
Lemma 5 The inclusive best reply of each merging platform is shifted downward by a
merger. Hence a merger of two media platforms leads to a decrease in the aggregate.
Proof. The merged entity of platforms  and  maximizes joint profits Π (Ψ) +
Π ¡Ψ¢.19 The first-order condition regarding platform  then becomes (see An-
derson, Erkal, and Picinnin, 2013)
Π (Ψ)
 +
Π (Ψ)
Ψ +
Π ¡Ψ¢
Ψ = 0
18The Lemma also applies under two-sided pricing, as considered in Section 6.
19Or indeed, a cooperative venture or other coordination between agents.
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The two first-order conditions can be solved simultaneously to find  and  as
functions of the aggregate, giving  (Ψ) and  (Ψ) as the individual inclusive best
reply functions under merger. The last term on the left-hand side of both first-
order conditions is negative (by the competitiveness property). This implies that
the inclusive reply function  must take a lower value than before the merger; i.e.,
 (Ψ)  (Ψ) for all Ψ, and likewise for the other platform . Therefore, the sum of
the inclusive best replies falls, and the aggregate must be lower with the merger.
The next result delivers the effects of merger on platforms and consumers.
Proposition 4 The merger of two platforms
1. is profitable, and increases other platforms’ profits too,
2. decreases consumer surplus,
Proof. As per Lemma 5, the equilibrium aggregate goes down. Consumer surplus
decreases, as per Lemma 3. Outsider platforms’ actions decrease by strategic comple-
mentarity,20 and their profits increase, as per Lemma 4. Profit of the merged platform
increases because competitors’ actions decrease and the merged platforms now jointly
best reply to these.
Thus, similar to mergers in price competition models with differentiated products
(see Deneckere and Davidson, 1985), a merger is always profitable and industry plat-
form profits must increase. Merger increases advertising on all platforms for   0,
but decreases it for   0.
5 Media See-saws
We have shown so far that consumer surplus and profits move in different directions in
response to the changes we have considered. Our key question is which way advertiser
20So too do the merged parties’ actions (by strategic complementarity and because their inclusive
best replies moreover shift down).
19
surplus moves.
We recall that net advertiser surplus is  =P=1 (). We first show that
this can be written as a function of Ψ. The advertiser surplus on platform  is
() = 
Z 
0
(()− ())
where  = Ψ = (Ψ)Ψ (because media platforms choose actions as functions
of the aggregate Ψ). By inversion,  can be written as a function of . Hence net
advertiser surplus is a function of the aggregate, and in the sequel we exploit this
functional relationship to determine the consequences of changes.
For each platform, we know that a larger aggregate leads to a larger action  =
(Ψ) and, thus, for   0, a lower advertising level. Then, a larger Ψ would always
lead to a lower net advertiser surplus if each  did not change (or went down).
However, the total market base (the sum of the ’s) typically goes up with changes
that raise Ψ. This argument suggests that a see-saw is at play when advertising
is a nuisance and the market base expansion effect is weaker than the increased
competition effect that decreases ad levels. In such cases, which, as we shall argue,
constitute the norm for   0, a larger value of the aggregate increases consumer
surplus, but decreases advertiser surplus. We have to formally establish this see-saw
by taking into account changing market shares  and, more subtly, changing ad levels
on different platforms.
Some headway can be made for simple cases by evaluating changes of advertiser
surplus per consumer and changes in the composition of consumers across platforms.
However, we are able to obtain broader results by linking changes in advertiser surplus
on a platform to changes in profits.
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5.1 Entry of Media Platforms
We index the original  platforms such that  ≥ +1,  = 1   − 1. We suppose
that entry is efficient in the sense that an increase in the number of platforms in the
industry means that the most efficient among potential firms enters, while it is of
lower quality than the incumbents.
To establish a see-saw, we have to show that industry advertiser surplus is de-
creasing with entry. If the market is fully covered this is easily argued. Here industry
advertises surplus decreases with platform entry due to downshifting of consumers to
the lowest quality platform, which generates a lower ad surplus per consumer.
However, with partial coverage, there is the countervailing benefit from market
expansion. On the one hand, because 0  Ψ (by Lemma 2), all original plat-
forms lose market share to the new platform, as argued above, but now the overall
market coverage increases. On the other hand, since competition among platforms
becomes stronger with entry, ad levels decrease. While increased coverage is good for
advertisers, lower ad levels are bad. Thus, it is a priori unclear whether advertisers
benefit or suffer from entry. In asymmetric oligopoly it appears a priori even less
clear what will happen, as platforms differ in the advertiser surplus per viewer they
generate. Nonetheless, we are able to provide a simple and intuitive sufficient con-
dition, the proof of which engages the characterization structure of the model (that
higher quality platforms set higher ad levels, Proposition 2) and the regularity condi-
tion of Assumption 2 on the advertiser demand function, which enables us to bound
advertiser surplus changes from profit changes (by applying Lemma 1).
As the next proposition establishes, industry advertiser surplus decreases with
entry if additional entry reduces industry platform profits; i.e.,
P
=1 () P+1
=1  ( ), where the superscript  refers to the new situation, with entry.
Proposition 5 For   0, the entry of an additional platform +1 ≤  decreases
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net advertiser surplus if entry reduces platform industry profits.
Proof. We have to show that
X
=1
() 
+1X
=1
 ( ) (9)
The condition for entry to reduce platform industry profits can be written as
X
=1
£()−  ( )¤  +1(+1)
which says that the entrant’s profit is smaller than the loss on other platforms. Equiv-
alently,
X
=1
£()−  ( )¤ (+1)(+1)  +1(+1)(
+1)
(+1)  (10)
From Proposition 2, we know that  ≥  for all   . Applying Lemma 1,
( )
( ) ≥
(+1)
(+1)  for all  = 1  
In addition, platforms  = 1   have lower profits after entry (()− ( ) 
0 for all  = 1  ). Thus inequality (10) implies
X
=1
£()−  ( )¤ ( )( )  +1(+1) (11)
From the analysis in Section 4.2 we also know that platforms  = 1   choose lower
advertising levels after entry; i.e.,  ≥  . Thus, using Lemma 1, we must have
()
() ≥
( )
( ) 
Hence, inequality (11) implies
X
=1
∙
()()() − 

 ( )(
 )
( )
¸
 +1(+1) (12)
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Simplifying this expression, we obtain
X
=1
£()−  ( )¤  +1(+1)
which is equivalent to inequality (9).
This proposition (combined with Proposition 3) establishes the see-saw under
entry: consumers are better off, while advertisers are worse off as long as further
entry reduces total platform industry profits.21 Advertisers are then on the same
“side” as the incumbent platforms, and the opposite side from consumers.
The see-saw holds under the sufficient condition that total platform industry prof-
its should fall with entry. As background, one would usually expect total profits to be
a hump-shaped function of the number of platforms. In a market with few firms and
scarce market coverage, entrants are likely to have mild competitive and business-
stealing effects. Conversely, if the market is close to fully covered already, the overall
market expansion is very slight, and entry plays out in tougher competition in ad
levels.22 The latter case is when we should expect to see advertiser surplus go down
— severe ad level reductions are not sufficiently offset by market expansion.
Proposition 5 clearly includes the case when platforms qualities are symmetric.
In this case there are no cross-platform reallocations because of different ad levels
across platforms to factor into the analysis. Proposition 5 allows for any pattern of
platform asymmetries (modulo the proviso that the entrant is of no higher quality).
A few words on the proof are in order. We express advertiser surplus per platform
21The condition is both necessary and sufficient when advertiser demand has constant elasticity.
In that case, advertiser surplus per consumer is equal to a fixed fraction of revenue per consumer.
Then,  is a constant fraction of platform industry profit, so that  rises (or falls) whenever
total profits rise (or fall). While constant elasticity functions are not log-concave (they are "too
convex"), the example illustrates the strong link between the two surpluses.
22These ideas can also be expressed in terms of model parameters. The lower is , the more
substitutable are platforms and the greater the reduction of competitor market share relative to
market expansion, so that entry is likely to reduce industry profits. Conversely, the larger is 0, the
more attractive the outside option and the more likely it is that entry raises industry profit because
the platforms are more strongly competing with the outside option and less so with each other.
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summed over all platforms as platform profit times the ratio of advertiser surplus per
platform to platform profits. The latter ratio is useful since Lemma 1 tells us that
it is increasing in the ad level. We then use the result that higher-quality platforms
have more ads, and that entry leads all platforms to reduce ad levels. This allows us
to provide bounds on industry advertiser surplus. Then, the condition that industry
profits decrease with entry implies that industry advertiser surplus also decreases.
The take-away is quite different if consumers like ads: for   0, advertisers
benefit from entry. Both of the impacts of entry bolster this conclusion. A larger
consumer base, as the total consumer market expands, improves advertiser surplus.
Moreover, the conflicting force in the   0 case now works in the opposite direction:
more competition increases ad levels for   0, with concurrent increases in advertiser
surplus per viewer, ceteris paribus. Thus, for   0, consumer and advertiser welfare
tend to be aligned: more advertisers tend to make more contacts. If the entrant is
of lower quality it attracts some viewers from other platforms. For   0 a lower
quality is associated with a higher ad level. Hence, all effects work in the same
direction: market coverage (weakly) rises, ad levels rise, and any diversion of demand
to the new platform upshifts to higher ad-surplus per consumer. Therefore, advertiser
surplus unambiguously increases with entry and there is no see-saw when consumers
are ad-loving (  0).
5.2 Media Mergers
Mergers induce two opposing effects on advertiser surplus when ads are a nuisance
(  0). While ad levels on platforms rise, market coverage falls (this holds since Ψ is
lower after the merger which boosts the market share of outside option 0Ψ). There
are also shifts in platforms’ relative market shares, which means that consumers may
be shifted to platforms carrying more or fewer ads.
After a merger, each platform carries more ads and, thus, () increases. Be-
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cause the market share of each outsider media platform increases, as shown in Propo-
sition 2, advertiser surplus associated to each outsider media platform must increase.
However, the overall effect on the advertiser surplus associated with the merged en-
tity is a priori unclear because  +    +  after a merger between media
platforms  and  (the merged platforms’ combined base shrinks).
We can already give a preliminary analysis of the possibility of a see-saw by
tracking how consumers switch platforms following a merger. Assume that the market
is fully covered, in order to close down the effect of reduced overall market coverage.
Suppose too that the merger involves the two lowest-quality media platforms and that
their quality difference is small. (This latter stipulation ensures consumer reallocation
goes towards platforms with more ads). Then merger increases advertiser surplus. To
see this, first recall that the merged platforms  and −1 also feature more advertising
after the merger than before. If both  and −1 +  decrease after the merger,
then all net shifts in consumers are shifts to platforms with more ads (since all other
’s rise).23 So it remains to show that  and −1 +  decrease after the merger.
The latter is a direct implication of Proposition 2 since the aggregate Ψ is down and
so all outsiders have a larger market share. The former necessarily holds if  = −1
and, by continuity, for  − −1 sufficiently small.
This see-saw result is of course very particular, but we cannot go much further by
simply looking at the patterns of shifts, without drawing on some stronger restrictions
that relate profit changes to advertiser surplus changes. Assumption 2 again provides
just such a condition, and enables us to deploy Lemma 1 to bound advertiser surplus
changes by insider profit changes. Recall that the merger is profitable, so total profit
goes up on both insider platforms taken together. If profit goes up on each indi-
vidually, then the Lemma tells us that advertiser surplus must go up. The possible
23Thus, market share needs to shift away from low-quality platforms towards high-quality plat-
forms.
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confound is when profit goes up on the weaker platform and down on the stronger
one. But if it rises on the stronger one, the consumer reallocation effect works in the
right direction. That is, we now get traction when ()   ( ) for   ,
where  denotes the advertising level after the merger. When this individual prof-
itability condition does not hold, we recourse to a standard logit formulation (i.e., 
is log-linear) to show the result.
Proposition 6 For   0, a merger of two platforms increases advertiser surplus if
1. the profit on the merged platform with higher quality increases, or
2. in the standard logit case.
Proof. Proposition 4 shows that both insider and outsider platforms increase their
profits. They also increase their ad levels. Because outsider market shares rise,
advertiser surplus must increase on outsider platforms. The rest of the proof considers
advertiser net surplus on insider platforms.
For part 1 we wish to show that a merger raises net advertiser surplus if profit
on the merged platform with higher quality goes up. We distinguish two cases.
First, suppose profit on each of the merged platforms goes up with the merger, so
 ( )  (), for  ∈ . This inequality is equivalent to
( )
( ) 

 ( )  ()() ()
Since by hypothesis  ( )  () for  ∈ , this inequality is implied by
( )( )  ()(), for  ∈ . Since    and, by Lemma 1,
((()()) ≥ 0), advertiser surplus increases more strongly than revenue on
each platform.
Second, suppose that profit of the platform  of higher quality goes up, while
profit of the platform  of lower quality in the merger goes down; i.e.,    
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for   . We know that prior to the merger   . This ordering is preserved
after the merger; i.e.,    . In addition, we know that the merger increases
advertising on each of the merging platforms; i.e.,    and   . Since the
merger increases joint profits of the merged platforms, by rearranging and multiplying
by   , we obtain the inequality
(  − )

  ( − 

  )

 
Since   , Lemma 1 implies that    , so that
(  − )

  ( − 

  ) 
Since    and   , Lemma 1 implies respectively that    
and    , thus implying:
 

 − 

  

 − 

  

 
Simplifying and rearranging gives that   +     + , as
desired.
The proof of part 2 of the proposition where  is log-linear is more involved and
provided in Appendix 1.
The idea of the proof of part 1 is quite simple when profit of each of the merged
platforms increases. We argued already at the start of this sub-section that advertiser
surplus on outsider platforms necessarily rises. When profits also go up on each insider
platform, then so does advertiser surplus.24 When the merging parties have the same
quality, this profit condition holds by symmetry.25
24For constant elasticity advertiser demands mentioned earlier, the result is even sharper. Because
total advertiser surplus is proportional to profit, then advertiser surplus must increase because total
platform profits rise with any merger.
25By continuity, it also holds when the qualities are not too different, so that Proposition 6(1)
nests the analysis at the beginning of the present subsection.
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While we might usually expect profits to go up for each party to a merger, this
property may not be true if they are sufficiently asymmetric. However, our result con-
tinues to hold when the merger promotes the higher-quality platform at the expense
of the other. Proposition 6(2) establishes a see-saw absent any profit condition under
a specific functional form for  (which corresponds to the standard logit model). The
proof here exploits the property (which we establish) that the ad level for both parties
to a merger is set at the same level in this case.
As we argue next, our results extend naturally to mergers with synergies as long
as these synergies are not too pronounced. We consider synergies in the form of
higher  of the merged parties. As a borderline case, the merger is consumer surplus-
neutral. Considering consumer-surplus neutral mergers simplifies the analysis because
consumer surplus and advertiser surplus on outsider platforms is not affected. A
particular case is where  of each merged party is the same before and after the
merger. For   0, this implies that the merged parties increase their advertising 
so as to leave their action  unchanged. Consequently, Ψ is the same before and
after the merger. However, since  has increased on the merged platform, advertiser
net surplus on this platform has gone up.
Considering only mergers which do not change the  between the merged plat-
forms is restrictive. For   0, consider now a consumer surplus-neutral merger after
which the content quality of both parties involved in the merger weakly increases.
If, after the merger,    of the merged platforms  and , then    and
   . Since the merger is consumer surplus-neutral,  +  =  +  . This
implies that outside the special case considered above, after the merger either one of
the platforms has a larger market share than before the merger. A sufficient condi-
tion for the merger to be advertiser surplus increasing is (i) each platform chooses a
larger advertising level than the maximal advertising level among those two platforms
prior to the merger — i.e., min{   }  max{   } — or (ii) the higher-quality
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platform  (with   ) gains market share as a result of the merger — i.e.,  − 
is positive whenever    prior to the merger.
For mergers with lower synergies than those required for a consumer surplus neu-
tral merger, there is a see-saw: consumers are worse off after the merger, while adver-
tisers and platforms are better off.26
Finally, we consider the case where consumers like ads (  0). A merger in this
case decreases the aggregate and decreases ads on all platforms, with the total market
shrinking. Both these indicators point to less advertiser surplus. For example, with
symmetric platform qualities, there can be no possible advantageous reallocation of
consumers toward platforms with higher advertiser surplus, so that there is no see-
saw: platforms gain while consumers and advertisers lose.27
5.3 Advertising Regulation
Many countries limit the amount of advertising allowed on TV (e.g., EU Directive 97,
with local ordinances in addition). Such regulation may benefit consumers when ads
annoy consumers (  0). However, it may negatively affect advertiser surplus. As
we show, ad caps help consumers at the expense of advertisers and platforms through
the see-saw effect.
The aggregative game approach, together with the log-concavity of advertiser
demand, provides a clean way to analyze the effect on ad levels and consumer surplus
of advertising regulation. Because  =  ( − ), an ad cap constitutes a floor to
the inclusive best reply function, and therefore renders the inclusive best reply flat for
26Clearly, the merged firm is better off after the merger. Since the aggregator is less than before
the merger, also profits of outsider platforms are higher after the merger.
27To construct a case when advertiser surplus can rise with merger is a challenge, but consider the
following. Suppose that the market were fully covered, and the merger involved two platforms of the
highest quality. Then, it would have to be the case that sufficient numbers of consumers (sufficient
to offset the lower ad levels everywhere) are diverted away from the merging parties and towards
those other platforms, which carry more ads.
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low levels of Ψ up to the point where the cap no longer binds (i.e., at high enough Ψ,
recalling that actions are strategic complements). Such a floor is depicted in Figure
2. The larger platforms (those with highest ) are the most affected because they are
the ones that would otherwise choose the highest ad levels. In equilibrium, we may
then have a mix of large, ad capped platforms and smaller, non-constrained ones (the
reverse cannot happen). The floor induced by the ad-cap thus increases the inclusive
best reply function. Consequently, if the cap is binding for at least one platform, the
aggregate rises. Due to strategic complementarity, the equilibrium actions () of the
non-constrained platforms must increase. This means that their ad levels decrease
due to tougher competition for consumers. Because all platforms reduce advertising
levels, consumers are necessarily better off whenever binding advertising caps are
introduced (as is also seen by applying Lemma 3).
A priori, the effect of an advertising cap on advertiser surplus is far from clear.
While advertisers are directly hurt by the cap (because it reduces ad levels and raises
ad prices), a cap on the largest platform leads to an increase in that platform’s
consumer base in equilibrium.28 The total consumer base also rises so that while
advertiser surplus per viewer decreases on each platform there are more viewers in
total and on the platform with the largest ad level in particular.
Proposition 7 The introduction of advertising caps
1. decreases all platforms’ profits;
2. increases consumer surplus;
3. decreases advertiser surplus.
28To see this, Ψ rises and all unconstrained platforms’ market shares decrease (by Lemma 2), as
does the market share of the outside option. The capped platform’s market therefore rises as does
total viewership.
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Figure 2: Ad cap regulation and equilibrium aggregate
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Proof. Consider a cap that only binds on the highest-quality platform (for illus-
tration, see Figure 2). The upward shift of its inclusive best reply leads to a larger
equilibrium Ψ, and part 2 of the proposition follows. By the strategic complementar-
ity result in Lemma 2, all unconstrained platforms’ equilibrium actions  rise and,
therefore, their advertising levels fall in concert (hence ad levels decrease on all plat-
forms). Moreover, by the slope result in Lemma 2, their market shares Ψ fall.29
Therefore, both profits and advertiser surplus on all uncapped platforms decreases.
Moreover, the profit on the capped platform also decreases (despite the fact that its
market share rises): the ad cap reduces its profit for given Ψ and the rise in Ψ further
reduces its profit. This proves part 1.
Finally, consider advertiser surplus on the capped platform. Let superscript 
denote equilibrium values when advertising regulation is in place. For the ad-capped
platform, we want to show that ()  ().
This is equivalent to
()(
)
()  ()
()
() 
This is true because profit falls, ()  (), and because ()() 
()() by Lemma 1 given   . The argument extends to ad caps that affect
multiple platforms.
While non-discriminatory ad caps necessarily affect the highest-quality platform,
our proof applies for an ad cap imposed on any platform (or group of platforms).
Thus, our result also holds for discriminatory ad caps on specific platforms. Such
discriminatory ad caps often apply for public service broadcasters which are subject
to more severe ad caps than their rivals. Advertising regulation delivers an unambigu-
ous see-saw when ad caps apply to the public service broadcaster, but not to private
29Following the ad cap, outsider platforms take the hit in terms of reducing both "price" and
"quantity" dimensions of profit: they reduce both ad levels and shares.
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ones. Lowering the ad cap for public broadcasters (or imposing zero ads, such as on
the BBC) leads to an increase of the aggregate and is, therefore, consumer-surplus
increasing. Advertiser net surplus necessarily falls in the industry because all plat-
forms reduce ad levels and more viewers watch public channels, which provide lower
advertiser surplus after the cap is lowered. Hence, the see-saw holds for advertising
regulation of public broadcasters.
6 Two-sided pricing
So far we analyzed ad-financed media platforms. Other media and trading platforms
have revenues both from advertising and from subscription. Such platforms have
two-sided pricing as their business model. Then, viewers are exposed to advertising
and have to pay a subscription fee  (which we allow to be negative) to subscribe to
platform .
We contend that see-saws have less currency in such an environment, the reason
being that two-sided pricing uncouples the advertising decision from the equilibrium
market share. In the following, we sketch the argument: full details are found in
Appendix 2.
The viewer choice model is the same as in the previous setting except that we
now include subscription pricing by writing market shares as  = () exp{−} () exp{−} .30
Each viewer generates revenues  () + . Thus, the profit of platform  is
Π = ( () + )  () exp{−}P
 () exp{−} (13)
We can treat the profit-maximization problem of each platform in two steps.31
We define actions  =  () exp{−}, with the corresponding aggregate as Ψ =P
=0  and 0 = (0). For any choice of action level , platform  determines the
30This can be derived by writing the utility (2) from choosing platform  as  = ln()−+ .
31See also Anderson and Coate (2005) and Armstrong (2006).
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price structure; i.e., the composition choice of  and , by maximizing ( () + )
subject to  () exp (−) = . Assuming that  () is concave delivers a unique
solution ¯ such that
0 (¯) = 
0 (¯)
 (¯)  (14)
where ¯ =  − ¯. The right-hand side increases in  and the left-hand side
decreases under the assumption that  is concave, so that the unique solution is
independent of the price  and the decisions of other platforms. Moreover, with  ()
strictly log-concave, ad levels increase (decrease) with  for   0 (  0). We have
therefore that  =  (¯) exp{−}, so that  is a decreasing function of  and
so can be used as the action variable in the aggregate game.
The main plank for our contention that advertiser surplus and consumer surplus
tend to be aligned starts from a couple of key properties. First, equilibrium ad levels
are independent of market structure, as noted above. Second, the characterization
results of Proposition 2 still hold, so that higher qualities garner higher equilibrium
market shares (along with higher equilibrium ad levels for   0, given the remark in
the previous paragraph).
With induced changes in ad levels effectively off the table, the effects of market
structure changes are now quite straightforward. Consumer surplus and profit changes
are as before, which should not be too surprising. Advertiser surplus changes are now
solely directed by changes in market shares, with the wrinkle again that consumers
might be reallocated to platforms with higher advertiser surplus. Note that if  is
log-linear, by (14) all platforms carry the same ad levels (and this is true after mergers
too), so that surplus simply follows total market coverage (this is true regardless of
the sign of ): in this case advertiser surplus and consumer surplus are fully aligned
for entry and mergers.
Platform entry causes an overall expansion in market coverage, so the only possi-
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ble offset (for   0) to an increase in advertiser surplus is if the entering platform has
lower quality.32 We conclude that there is no see-saw for entry with symmetric qual-
ities. Merger has the opposite effects and conclusions are analogous: with symmetric
qualities, there is no see-saw.
Consumer and advertiser interests (perhaps surprisingly) also tend to be aligned
under ad caps: both groups suffer from binding caps. The reason why consumers are
worse off (despite aversion to ads) comes from platforms increasing their subscription
prices. An ad cap makes the platform that is subject to this regulation become less
aggressive for market share (a downward shift of the inclusive best reply — contrast
the case of the ad-finance model), as each consumer becomes less valuable on the ad-
vertiser side. Hence, for given actions of non-constrained platforms, it offers a worse
deal to consumers. By strategic complementarity, all other platforms increase their
subscription fees too. Here the regulation of one “price” (the lower ad nuisance that
is supported by a higher ad price) affects the other price, namely the subscription
fee: the lower ad level induces a higher consumer price. This is an instance of a “wa-
terbed effect”.33 This effect is so strong that the utility loss from the induced higher
subscription fee even dominates the reduction of the ad nuisance, and consumers are
actually worse off after the regulatory intervention. Advertisers tend to be worse off,
as the capped platform delivers fewer ads and fewer consumers participate. If the
non-capped platforms have weakly fewer ads than the capped platform advertisers
are necessarily worse off. However, industry platform profits rise. Binding ad caps
mean that at least some platforms are constrained in their use of instruments in ex-
tracting revenues. This is an instance where limiting the use of one strategic variable
32A decrease in advertiser surplus happens with a lower-quality entrant entering a fully covered
market where  () is strictly log-concave.
33The waterbed effect has been prominent in the debate on regulatory interventions in telecom-
munications markets. Genakos and Valletti (2011, 2015) find empirical evidence in support of the
waterbed effect in mobile telecommunications markets.
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increases industry profits to the detriment of both sides of the market.
7 Conclusion
Media platforms cater to two distinct audiences, advertisers and viewers-cum-consumers.
Advertisers care about reaching viewers, while the utility of viewers is affected by the
amount of advertising carried by the media platform of their choice. We present a
multi-platform model in which consumers make discrete choices among media plat-
forms and an outside option, and advertisers can advertise on multiple platforms. We
find that markets with ad-financed media where advertising annoys viewers exhibit
see-saws: market changes that increase consumer surplus reduce advertiser surplus
and vice versa. In particular, entry benefits consumers, but tends to hurt advertis-
ers, while a media merger reduces consumer surplus but tends to benefit advertisers.
These see-saws mostly disappear when consumers are ad lovers or when platforms
also charge viewers directly and so engage in two-sided pricing.
The results on advertiser surplus are the most intricate ones. Entry has two
opposing effects. It increases total consumer participation, which is beneficial for
advertisers, but it leads to less advertising on each platform, which hurts advertisers.
The overall effect is necessarily negative for advertisers if platform industry profit
decreases with entry (of a lower-quality platform). Media mergers necessarily increase
advertiser surplus in the standard logit case. In the more general setting studied
in this paper, media mergers increase advertiser surplus if the profit of the higher-
quality platform that is part of the merger increases with the merger (which condition
necessarily holds if the merging platforms are symmetric).
See-saws are also present when ad caps are used. In markets with ad-financed
media platforms, advertisers suffer from lower advertising levels on all platforms.
However, a mitigating effect is that the ad-capped platforms gain market share, which
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benefits advertisers because ad-capped firms carry more ads than firms for which the
cap is not binding. We show that this latter effect is dominated, and so advertising
regulation exhibits a see-saw. The see-saw disappears when platforms use two-sided
pricing. While ad caps per se are in the interest of consumers, they reduce platforms’
incentives to attract viewers. Then, they increase subscription fees with the overall
effect that consumers suffer, as well as advertisers.
Our results immediately carry over to other two-sided markets. For instance,
suppose that platforms decide on how many sellers to host and consumers obtain
part of the gains from trade in the interaction with sellers. This setting corresponds
to when consumers enjoy advertising. Our analysis then covers both business models
in which only sellers pay, and those in which the platform charges consumers for
participation. Competing shopping malls furnish one example; electronic market
places which host shops in different product categories are another.
We have concentrated in this paper on situations where media consumers choose
at most one media outlet to watch (or read, or listen to). This “single-homing”
assumption gives rise to a “competitive bottleneck” situation (Armstrong, 2006)
whereby each platform is the only conduit for reaching its consumers, while advertis-
ers “multi-home,” and therefore competition is primarily for viewers. See-saws seem
unlikely to arise when there is a significant amount of consumer multi-homing. In
such situations, competition for advertisers takes a stronger role. Ambrus, Calvano
and Reisinger (2015) and Anderson, Foros, and Kind (2015) emphasize the ability
of platforms to deliver exclusive viewers, and charge advertisers more for them than
for viewers delivered by multiple platforms. Then, they argue that merger may raise
prices to advertisers (and reduce their surplus) because merged platforms jointly con-
trol greater exclusive access. Entry, insofar as it offers more choice and hence more
multi-homing, tends to reduce the numbers of exclusive viewers on platforms and re-
duce advertising prices while increasing total numbers of consumers accessed. Merger
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then reduces advertiser surplus, while entry raises it.
8 Appendix
8.1 Appendix 1: Relegated proofs
Proof of Lemma 2. The right-hand side of (6) is denoted by
() ≡ 1 + 
0(())
(()) 
0()
which is well-defined for  6= 0.
First, we show that (for any  6= 0)  0()  0. Using (6),
 0 () = −
µ 

¶½µ0

¶0 
0 −
0

µ 
0
¶0¾
The sign of −
³

´
has the sign of . Consider the term in curly brackets. Since
 is strictly log-concave,
³0()
()
´0
is negative. Together with 0  0, this implies
that the first term in the above expression has the sign of −. Since  is log-concave
(0)0 is non-negative. Together with the result that  is chosen in the increasing
part of  for   0 and in the decreasing part of  for   0, we have that −0
¡ 
0
¢0
has the sign of − too (or is zero). Hence, as the term in curly brackets has the sign
of −,  0 has the sign of −2  0.
Thus, Ψ = () uniquely defines the inclusive best reply (Ψ) for all admis-
sible Ψ.
Second, we show that (for  6= 0) inclusive best replies embody strategic comple-
mentarity, i.e., 0(Ψ)  0. Differentiating the inverse of the best reply, Ψ = ()
we obtain
Ψ
 =
()−  0()
2 () 
Since   0, it is sufficient that  0  0, which has been established by the previous
lemma.
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Third, we show that (for  6= 0) slopes of inclusive best replies are below average
actions, 0 (Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ . We can rewrite 0 (Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ as 
2− 0 
Ψ . Using the
first-order condition Ψ = , this is equivalent to − 0  1, which is satisfied as
 0  0.
Proof of Proposition 6 (2), log-linear case. First we show that if  is log-linear,
then after the merger advertising levels are the same on insider platforms  and ,e ≡ e = e. Note that profits of merged platforms  and  are
()()Ψ +()
()
Ψ 
The first-order condition with respect to  can be written as
0()()Ψ − ()
µ0()
Ψ −
0()()
Ψ2
¶
+ ()()
0()
Ψ2 = 0
This is equivalent to
0()− ()
µ0()
() −
0()
()
()
Ψ
¶
+ ()()Ψ
0()
() = 0
or
1

()
0()
0()−()
µ
1− ()Ψ
¶
+()()Ψ = 0
Rewriting this equation we haveµ
1

()
0()
0()
() − 1
¶
() = −()()Ψ −()
()
Ψ  (15)
We obtain the corresponding equation for the first-order condition obtained from
maximizing with respect to . Since the right-hand side of these equations are the
same, we must haveµ
1− 1
()
0()
0()
()
¶
() =
µ
1− 1
()
0()
0()
()
¶
() (16)
For  log-linear, ()0() is constant and  =  must be a solution to this
equation. It is the unique solution, as shown by contradiction. Suppose that there
39
is a solution with   . Then, for   0, ()  () and 0()() 
0()(). Since terms in brackets of (16) must be positive (by equation (15)), this
is a contradiction. Similarly, for   0, we have ()  () and 0()(()) 
0()(()), which also leads to a contradiction.
Second, since  =  ≡ e, post merger,  and  are the same on merging
platforms  and  in this case.
Third, since a merger is profitable, there must exist artificial shares ˆ, ˆ with
ˆ+ ˆ = e+ e such that, using these artificial shares, platform profits increase on
each platform; i.e., ˆ(e)  () and ˆ(e)  ().
Fourth, by Lemma 5 the merger leads to lower equilibrium actions  and, thus,
for   0, higher advertising level on each of the merging platforms, e  , where 
denotes the equilibrium advertising level prior to the merger.
Fifth, we are now in a position to show that net advertiser surplus on insider plat-
forms after the merger is larger than before the merger,
P
∈ e(e) =P∈ ˆ(e) P
∈ (), where  is the set of insiders. This inequality is equivalent toX
∈
(e)
(e) ˆ(e) X∈ ()() ()
Since, ˆ(e)  () for  ∈ , this inequality is implied by (e)(e) 
(∗)(∗), for  ∈ . For   0, since e  ∗ and, by Lemma 1, (()()) ≥
0, advertiser surplus increases more strongly than revenue on each platform.
8.2 Appendix 2: Supplementary analysis of two-sided pricing
Using the definition of  from the main text in Section 6, we rewrite each platform’s
objective function
Π = ( (¯) + ) Ψ
= ( −  ln) Ψ
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where  =  (¯) +  ln (¯).
Proposition 8 Suppose that  is strictly concave. There exists a unique equilibrium.
Proof. The inclusive best reply (Ψ) = argmax Π(Ψ) satisfies the first-order
condition of profit maximization with respect to ,
−
Ψ + ( −  ln)
µ
1
Ψ −

Ψ2
¶
= 0
or, equivalently,
−+ ( −  ln)
µ
1− Ψ
¶
= 0
This can be rewritten as
1− 
( −  ln) =

Ψ  (17)
We define
 () ≡ 1−  −  ln
and write the first-order condition as  () = Ψ. Since we immediately observe
that
( )0 = − 

( −  ln)2
 0
the slope of the inclusive best reply with two-sided pricing lies between 0 and .
Notice that a profit-maximizing platform sets  ∈ [−()∞). Actions  must
exceed the monopoly action min defined as the solution to
1− 
( −  ln) =

 + (0) 
Thus  is chosen in [min  () exp{()}]. Thus, the sum of inclusive best repliesP
=1 (Ψ) + 0 is defined on [max∈{1}{min }
P
=1 () exp{()}+ (0)].
Consider
P
=1 (Ψ) + 0 which maps from a compact interval into itself. Clearly,P
=1 (max∈{1}{min })+(0)  max∈{1}{min } and
P
=1 (
P
=1 () exp{()}+
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(0)) + (0) P=1 () exp{()}+ (0). SinceP=1 (Ψ) is continuous in
Ψ, there must exist an interior solution to 0 +P=1 (Ψ) = Ψ and, therefore, an
equilibrium exists. Furthermore, since 0 (Ψ)  (Ψ)Ψ in any equilibrium the sum of
inclusive best replies crosses the diagonal from above and the equilibrium is unique.
The equilibrium is characterized by equations (17). As the following proposition
establishes, the cross-section characterization of Proposition 2 also holds with two-
sided pricing when  is strictly log-concave.
Proposition 9 Suppose that  is strictly concave. Consider any two platforms  and
. Whenever   , in equilibrium    and () ≥ (). For   0 and 
strictly log-concave,    implies that   . For   0 and  strictly log-concave,
   implies that   . For  log-linear, all platforms choose the same ad level.
Proof. As  =  (¯) +  ln (¯), we have  = 0 (¯) ¯ + 
0(¯)
(¯)
³
1−  ¯
´
.
Denote  = (ln (¯))00. Now, using the definition of ¯, 0 (¯) −  0(¯)(¯) = 0,
we have that ¯ =

”+2 which has the sign of  (under the assumption that 
is concave). So now both terms in the expression  above are positive: the first
because 0 (¯) and ¯ have the same sign; the second because 1− ¯ = 
00
”+2  0.
Therefore,  is increasing in  (regardless of the sign of ).
Consider now the inclusive best reply. Recall that the inclusive best reply satisfies
(the LHS is the function  used above):
1− 
( −  ln) =

Ψ ;
or inverse inclusive best reply is
Ψ = 
1− 
(− ln)
.
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This shows the property that higher  (from higher ) shifts the inclusive best reply
up; i.e., for larger , a given Ψ is associated with a higher . To summarize, when 
strictly log-concave,    implies that    and    for   0, while   
implies that    and    for   0. When  is log-linear,    implies that
 =  and   .
Of course, subscription fees depend on quality. Using the first-order condition, we
obtain by implicit differentiation that  has the sign of
−0(¯)¯

( (¯) + )2 +
0 (¯) exp{− }(1−   )
Ψ 
Clearly, in the log-linear case, ad level are independent of quality and, therefore,  is
increasing in .
As in the previous section we consider three exogenous changes of market struc-
ture. First, we consider entry of an additional platform.
Proposition 10 The entry of an additional platform
1. leaves advertising on other platforms unchanged,
2. decreases other platforms’ profits,
3. increases consumer surplus,
4. increases advertiser surplus if platforms are symmetric or  is log-linear; for
  0 and  strictly log-concave, it decreases advertiser surplus if +1 
min{1  } and 0 = −∞; for   0 and  strictly log-concave, it un-
ambiguously increases advertiser surplus if +1  min{1  }.
Proof. As shown in the main text, ad levels are independent of market share and,
thus, unaffected by entry. In line with the proof of Proposition 3, after entry, in
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equilibrium, the aggregate Ψ goes up. Because all rivals’  increase, platform ’s
profit must decrease,  = 1  . Because Ψ goes up, from Lemma 3, consumer
surplus increases.
In the log-linear case, since ad levels are the same for all platforms and there are
more viewers in total, advertiser surplus must increase. For   0 and  strictly
log-concave, for asymmetric platforms there is a reshuffling of viewers toward the
lowest-quality platform, which carry fewer ads. Thus, advertiser surplus necessarily
decreases if platform +1 has lower quality than all other platforms and all consumers
participate. For   0 and  strictly log-concave, the lowest-quality platform has more
ads; entry then leads to a reshuffling of viewers toward the lowest-quality platform.
Furthermore, additional consumers may participate after entry. For both reasons,
advertiser surplus increases with entry in this case.
Different from markets with ad financed platforms, entry does not affect the ad-
vertising decision of other platform. Hence, changes in advertiser surplus are purely
due to reshuffling viewers. By contrast, under ad finance, additional entry has the
effect that platform offer less annoying programs by reducing the advertising level.
Under symmetry and full coverage, this does not lead to a see-saw effect. By con-
trast, in the two-sided pricing model, under symmetry and full coverage, advertisers
are unaffected. Proposition 10 adds that there may be a see-saw effect for   0,
in line with what we found for ad-financed media platforms. With two-sided pricing
results consumer and advertiser surplus are aligned for   0.
Second, we consider a merger of two platforms.
Proposition 11 The merger of two platforms
1. leaves advertising on all platforms unchanged,
2. is profitable and increases other platforms’ profits,
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3. decreases consumer surplus,
4. decreases advertiser surplus if platforms are symmetric or  is log-linear; for
  0 and  strictly log-concave, it increases advertiser surplus if the two lowest-
quality platforms merge and 0 = −∞; for   0 and  strictly log-concave,
it increases advertiser surplus if the two highest-quality platforms merge and
0 = −∞.
Proof. Again, ad levels are independent of market share; they are also unaffected
by the merger. The merger shifts the inclusive best response of the merged platforms
down. Hence, the merger decreases the aggregate Ψ and consumer surplus is down.
The second claim follows from the same argument as made in Proposition 4.
If platforms are symmetric or  is log-linear all platforms choose the same ad level.
Hence, advertiser surplus is monotone in the number of consumers that are served.
Since the merger leads to less consumer participation (0Ψ is decreasing in Ψ), ad-
vertiser surplus is lower after the merger. However, for   0, under full participation,
a merger among the lowest-quality platforms has the effect that these platforms loose
viewers who instead join higher-quality platforms. Therefore, advertiser surplus in-
creases in this case. Analogously, for   0, under full participation, a merger among
the highest-quality platforms has the effect that these platforms loose viewers who
instead join lower-quality platforms. Since, for   0, lower-quality platforms carry
viewer ads, advertiser surplus increases also in this case.
Outside the above special cases, for   0, a merger under two-sided pricing
decreases advertiser surplus if the two merging platforms are the highest-quality plat-
forms.
The merger result with two-sided pricing is in stark contrast to the results with ad
financing. We observe that with two-sided pricing advertiser and consumer surplus
tend to be aligned: if  is logconcave or platforms offer the same quality, then both
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sides of the market suffer from a merger. This result can only be offset if the number
of active viewers does not depend strongly on the merger and if platforms with low
ad levels merge, as the merger then leads to a reshuffling of viewers to platforms with
higher ad levels.
Third, we consider an ad cap on highest-quality platform ( strictly log-concave,
  0).
Proposition 12 The introduction of symmetric advertising caps that becomes bind-
ing for one platform
1. decreases consumer surplus,
2. decreases advertiser surplus.
Proof. As shown above, the introduction of an ad cap that is binding for the highest-
quality firm reduces . This shift the inclusive best reply downward, as is seen by
implicitly differentiating (17) with respect to .

 =

(− ln)2
1
Ψ +

(− ln)2


 0
The downward shift of platform ’s inclusive best reply leads to a lower aggregate
Ψ after the introduction of the ad cap. As shown in the main text, all non-capped
platforms do not change the ad level. Consumer surplus decreases as the aggregate
has gone down.
Since Ψ decreases, the market share of the uncapped platforms must increase.
Competition becomes less intense with an ad cap. As uncapped platforms do not ad-
just ad levels, a higher market share implies that advertiser surplus on those platforms
is up (also profit is up).
Market share of the capped platform is down and market share of outside option is
up. Regarding advertiser surplus per viewer we note the following: For all consumers
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who stay with the outside option or one of the uncapped platforms advertiser surplus
per viewer remains the same after the introduction of an ad cap. Some consumers
move from the capped platform to one of the other platforms (which contain less
advertising) or the outside option. Thus, advertiser surplus per viewer is down for
those consumers. The last group of consumers consists of those consumers which stay
with the platform that is subject to a binding cap after its introduction. By design,
this platform hosts fewer ads and thus advertiser surplus per viewer declines also for
these consumers. Combining all these changes, advertiser surplus must be decreasing.
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